Introduction
This article is about the silences that often are registered but not so often highlighted and analysed with the anthropological tools of the ethnographer, referring as these do to the empirical world that can be captured. While there is abundant literature that helps the ethnographer refine the technical aspects of the writing of the narrative, it has been only recently that die political implications behind the epistemology and ontology of ethnography as a research strategy have been addressed in any depth.
Rather than, therefore, looking at ways of improving the collection of data, this paper will consider an aspect that hidierto has been largely ignored in ethnography. The focus will be on what die edinographic text leaves unsaid. A number of silences will be identified with reference to the process, content, and political effectiveness of ethnographic narratives, although it will be argued that these silences or gaps are not all of the same kind, and that some rather than others are more promising in the construction of radical educational dieory and practice.
Qualitative research, in itself, seems litde concerned with the absences that frame (or are at the heart of) die narrative it weaves -the "reality" it claims to reflect -or the process dirough which the phenomena are represented. The roots of ethnography are to be found deeply embedded in a regime of realism, inasmuch as it sets out to represent the empirical world that "is." There is, indeed, a danger that die ethnographic narrative entraps die writer and reader in diis nominal positivist world: details of what happened, who spoke, what was said. It is the dictatorship of data, from which concepts and generalizations arise, "faithfully" representing the particulars from which they have been abstracted. In diese positivistic moments diat govern ethnographic representation, silence has little value and can only be regarded negatively -an empty absence which, in a matter of time, could and should become full of words.
Not so for the radical ethnographer who approaches phenomena in the spirit of Nietzsche or Marx or die critical theorists: as dangerous illusions, where the "what is not" is infinitely more important than the "what is." The non-positivist accords silences, gaps, and absences a special and prestigious place in his/her theoretical engagement with the world and looks to them for clues that will lead not only to reflexivity but to praxis. The "real" is subjected to problemization, for it is 20 RONALD G. SULTANA "historically produced in the course of conflicts and struggles or collective life. Realism stabilizes and naturalizes the objects and apparatuses of perception and knowledge" (Wexler, 1987, p. 85) . In purporting to tell us "what happened," realistic ethnography presents itself as a complete narrative. But the sum of the details of the ethnographic text never can be complete and is riven with contradictions and absences, for they too, in Lukacs's (1971) words, have to be understood "as aspects of a totality, i.e., as the aspects of a total social situation caught up in the process of historical change" (p. 162). How, then, to deal with the incompleteness of a text? This question does not imply that ethnographies somehow should be "complete texts" that "tell all there is to tell." As Tyler (1987) argues "Every attempt will always be incomplete, insufficient, lacking in some way, but this is not a defect since it is the means that enables transcendence. Transcendence comes from imperfection, not from perfection" (p. 136). But incompleteness does pose a challenge to die critic whose task is similar to that of a therapist, that is, "not to cure or complete [die text]; but to explain why it is as it is" (Eagleton, 1976, p. 92) . The problem with this kind of exercise, however, is that the silences and absences easily can become the repository for all that the critic projects.
So do we commit ourselves to nihilism when we privilege silence? Quite die contrary -it is to discover, if not the grand narratives, at least the master narratives (Giroux, 1988) diat shape detail. It is to balance delicately die more emancipatory moments of postmodernist diought widi that tradition that allows not only critique but also Utopian dreaming. To privilege silence is to realize diat text is ideology inasmuch as it attempts to reflect the world in a coherent and totalitizing manner. It is to admit, in die spirit of modern philosophy, die limits of reason and thus to open die way for die valuing of silence, unknown and unrespected by idealist and positivist philosophy alike. The privileging of silence is a strategy for recognizing die status of die edinographic text as a construct, and hence to render it immediately a candidate for deconstruction.
In order to accept this interpretation of silence, however, it also is necessary to presuppose die existence of some form of master narrative diat weaves die tale into some version of a totalizing vision -a point well made by McLaren (1988) when he argues in favour of an "arch of social dreaming... die conquest of a vision of what die total transformation of society might mean" (p. 74). But diis would seem to imply diat silence and gaps always are ideological, which would mean in practice diat simply by having die master narrative at hand, and using it as a template on die presenting narrative, will quickly show up die ideologically significant silences, now identifiable in confrontation widi the "whole story," as it were. It is dierefore important at diis point to construct a grammar of silence, to have some guidelines to mark a padi through die impossibly difficult task of finding our way dirough die maze of silence. As Macherey (1978) One way of working towards the resolution of diese questions is to consider the various types of silences that can be attributed to ethnography. I will do this in die next section of this paper, referring critically to an ethnographic study that I carried out in 1986 (Sultana, 1987 (Sultana, , 1992 in order to contextualize and illustrate the points that I make.
Ethnography and the semiotics of silence
In the identification of some of die more important silences within edinographic texts, it would be useful to classify die absences and gaps along certain criteria. I use two guidelines in developing diis classificatory system, die first being organizational, and die second political. While die concern of the former is to systematize die presentation of ideas, the latter interest is die political reciphering of diese silences in favor of transformative action in die world. In the interest of systematic presentation and clarity, I will number die variety of absences I identify, while in no way claiming diat there are no gaps widiin the very text diat I myself produce. These absences will refer to (a) process, (b) content, and (c) political ontology of edinographic texts. The concluding section of die paper will deal widi die politics of silence, pointing towards new ways of making diat silence speak in favor of a more just and humane world.
Ethnographic process and silence
The doing of edinography, the very choice of qualitative research as a tool, itself can be framed by a number of silences. Tyler (1985) and Clifford and Marcus (1986) argue that since edinography inscribes culture in discourse rather than merely describes it, it is die end of description, for the very act of writing binds politics and poetics. The choice of edinography, in this sense, needs to be justified as much as what one does with -and how one writes -ethnography. Many, including Gitlin, Siegel, and Boru (1989) , have highlighted die need to expose die formative influence behind die silence of die researcher, the "audior-as-audior" who often constitutes himself as "author-as-fieldworker," inviting die reader into the realm of narrative realism where everything there is to tell is narrated in a neutral fashion. It is because the researcher edits himself/herself out of the text that we often get so little information on such details as the researcher's expectations and presuppositions, or the surprises that were encountered in die field. Not diat the researcher can, in any real manner, suspend the biases diat are at work. Rather, as in Gadamer's (1979) discussion of modern hermeneutics, research should be characterized by a reflexivity diat enables us to understand the possibility of a multiplicity of viewpoints and "to respond to opposing arguments by a reflection which deliberately places us in the perspective of the other" (p. 110). But, as Gidin et al. (1989) argue, "It is impossible for the researcher to understand the 'subject' unless she/he enters into a dialogue with the 'subject' aimed at mutual understanding" (p. 243). They go on to point out the contradiction by those researchers who claim to be "concerned widi emancipatory change" and who therefore are "interested in contesting relations of domination," but who in fact "use a method which reproduces the type of relations they so despise" (p. 249).
Hence, in considering the silences and absences in the process of ethnographic research, it is precisely this possibility of gaining insight from others diat often is precluded, for the emphasis, as McLaren (1990) points out, is on doing research on, not with, others. It is this kind of approach that stresses, for instance, the need to keep the researcher's opinions and perspectives privy from diose being "researched." In carrying out my ethnographic study of three school communities in New Zealand, where the focus was die gauging of the school-to-work messages given by the form, content and process of the schools and the kinds of reception that the students afiForded these messages, I often was caught in a frustrating and ideologically contradictory position. Students, for instance, would tell me of sexist or racist attitudes and comments of teachers, but I would feel reluctant to confront the school communities widi diese criticisms, afraid diat such early feedback somehow would change die nature of the schools, and diat I would go against die ultimately positivist principle of introducing extraneous "variables" into die research (laboratory?) field.
The attempt not to jeopardize the research by trying hard not to change the situation by acting on it led, of course, to a number of problems. The maintenance of an "objective front" widi teachers, for instance, certainly reinforced the subordinate positions of teachers as "researched." The attempt at widiholding also creates some insincerities which I found difficult to deal widi, bodi at die ediical and die political level. For how can one possibly be effective in challenging teachers to regard dieir practice critically if, in our own work as researchers, we resort to underhand ways in order to satisfy our appetite for yet more detail?
It is perhaps for diis reason diat the point of view of diose researched too often is not heard widiin die edinographic report. Critics on die left, such as Reynolds (1980-1981, p. 84), have in fact taken interactionist edinographic accounts to task for canonizing die perspectives of die social members in die explanation of social phenomena, to die exclusion of die arbitration of die intellectual or social scientific class. But radical researchers too often have gone to die odier extreme and have been too ready to ignore, for instance, die cultural constraints under which teachers labor, leading to "teacherbashing" accounts diat effectively jeopardize any interaction between researchers (who "know it all") and workers in schools. While it does make sense to criticize ethnographies diat are influenced exclusively by phenomenological and edinomediodological traditions, it needs to be accepted diat die sense-making practices diat individuals utilize to interpret dieir world are to be given importance and diat, for epistemological and practical political reasons, diese should be "triangulated" widi odier possible accounts, including diose of die edinographer who positions herself/himself widiin a particular ideological discourse.
Anodier silence diat structures die creation of edinographic texts is die radier politically naive view diat these "anatomies of detail" (Wexler, 1987 , p. 85) somehow will be used automatically in favour of diose with whom die researcher has political sympathies. Few researchers have oudined die danger diat their edmographies will not become yet another of the panoptic erections in service of die governing episteme of our times to surveil, discipline, and punish. The consideration of diis became real for me when, in the course of feedback to staff in die school communities I had researched, I produced vivid descriptions of the resistant strategies developed by Maori students, widi die intention of encouraging a debate on die need for cross-cultural schooling. My hope that this would lead schools and teachers to become more sensitive to the realities that groups of students experience in their daily lives often was co-opted, however, and the data reinterpreted in terms of another goal, that is, that of better controlling what was often considered to be pathological behavior. There always is a risk, therefore, that the progressive agendas of ethnographers are hijacked and their labor appropriated for conservative, if not oppressive ends.
Content, silence, and the selective tradition
Ethnography as realist text seeks to reflect die empirical world that it focuses on, and in its more emancipatory moments it does so in a critical manner. While for some time the tradition has been to give pride of place to "thick description," the real promise of ethnography as a transformative tool is fulfilled when it becomes dieoretically embedded and when it, therefore, tries to recover the silenced context, die conditions and the relations in the light of which phenomena need to be apprehended. As West (1984) has argued so well, it has become possible to situate particular ethnographies widiin wider structural accounts, and this syndiesis of phenomenon and form is possible not only at die epistemological level but, as we shall see in die next section, also can be articulated at die political level (Sharp, 1982) .
Such a syndiesis is particularly promising in order to make sense of die gaps in narratives diat are to be found widiin institutions such as schools. Gramsci's notion of "hegemony" -as well as Williams's (1976) related insight diat one of die key ways dirough which control is maintained is dirough die "selective tradition" -are particularly useful dieoretical tools in our attempt at analysing what can be referred to as die "logic of nonevents." As Eagleton (1976) has argued, "ideology is present in die text in the form of its eloquent silences" (p. 89). In odier words, hegemony is possible because silence is privileged in a reactionary manner, and edinography attains its radical promise when, radier than dancing to the music it hears, it listens intendy to that silence, making diat silence speak volumes in favor of die powerless and oppressed.
There is an important kind of silence widi which a radical edinography should engage. This is die silence of the context in which die contents of die text is framed, what Bisseret (1979) calls "die referent." Silence dius constitutes part of die metaphysics of presence and, in contrast to die more anarchic moments of postmodernism, depends on "somediing being outside and anchoring the symbolic relations of die text" (Wexler, 1987, p. 135) . The referent functions by attributing lack or absence to those who do not possess die qualities attributed to odiers holding dominant positions. In die case of my own study, the hidden referent nearly always was die capitalist world of work as it is, and to which die students constandy and unproblematically were asked -coerced even -to refer to in dieir preparation for transition to "die" world of work (Sultana, 1988 (Sultana, , 1989 (Sultana, , 1990 . This is why my own edinography is replete widi references to that which was not said, and while, on the surface, such writing seems to contradict die nature of ethnographic writing, any radical researcher working widiin diis mode constandy has to appeal to diat which is not there. Indeed, what I prefer to call "inverted edinography" is die only way diat one can subvert die positivistic regime of realism diat still lingers on in diis research strategy. Those who do not read die silences in a text read from the same ideological framework, share die same repressions, and take
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RONALD G. SULTANA for granted die same silences.... It is still only by distancing ourselves from die familiar modes of representation diat we can expect to identify die areas on which ideology is silent. (Belsey, 1980, p. 137) The selective tradition needs to be exposed and explored in any ethnography diat claims for itself radical and transformative intentions. For the curriculum narrative revels in common-sense ideas mat express and encapsulate die requirements of die dominant class. In my own study, a curriculum diat purported to teach about die world of work prepared students to accept diat world uncritically, often failing to problematize key issues such as wealdi, power, oppression and exploitation, die wage relationship, class, gender, and race relations on the work-force, and collective struggle on die part of workers dirough trade unions. In such instances, silence is a key element in die discourse made available to students, having an ideological function inasmuch as it conceals die power relations that structure die content and process of die educational encounter. Not all silences in die content of die text are ideological in the sense developed above. There are meso (institutional) and micro (classroom) as well as macro contexts diat explain why some diings are left unsaid (McNeil, 1987) , though, diis having been said, die point can still be made diat the resulting silence can function in favor of die reproduction of die wider social formation. In my study, die silence of teachers on trade union matters did have an ideological function, but die context of die absence of messages on workers' movements often was motivated by a fear of conflict in the classroom. Anxiety diat different opinions about unions might lead to classroom conflict led many teachers to adopt "survival strategies" to ensure dieir own comfort radier dian educational ends (Hargreaves & Woods, 1984) .
But diis is not in itself a sufficient explanation of die "micro-dynamics" of silence. Remaining widi die example of messages about trade unions, it becomes clear diat classroom dynamics can interrelate widi ideological and macro reasons for the privileging of one silence over anodier. Those teachers who were afraid of conflict also were diose whose ideological positions were most obviously bourgeois, who would, for example, become hostile if someone suggested to them diat diey belonged to a "teachers' trade union" rather dian a "professional association." On the odier hand, diose who did break die silence on trade unions were diose who, like technical teachers, had participated at some stage in productive work and who had experienced first hand capitalist relations of production and dierefore had become politicized in favor of collective struggle and change.
The political ontology of ethnography
The problem diat needs to be addressed here is the silence diat reigns over die effectiveness of edinographic research strategies in bringing about change in school communities and in educational policy making, if not, as sometimes is claimed even more ambitiously, in die wider social sphere. Some researchers and mediodologists have given diis issue some attention, and Pollard (1984) , for instance, has argued diat it is perhaps realistic to expect edinography to have more impact at die micro level because of die nature of edinographic work, for it enhances the possibility diat actors in schools can make the movement from unexamined practical consciousness to the more critical self-and system-awareness of 'discursive consciousness" (Giddens, 1976) .
All this is acceptable, except diat diere have been few edinographic studies that
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have told the readers much about the effectiveness of their study in bringing about change in any progressive direction. We often are presented with richly detailed descriptions, but once the narrative ends, the implicit assumption is that the readers (presumably the teachers and administrators of the school communities researched would be among them) somehow will improve their practice just by reflecting on it. Change will follow, it is implied, after consciousness has been raised. But does change follow? This question applies equally to the institutional and classroom levels as it does to the macro societal level. For ethnography often has been justified on the grounds of its political effectiveness. Shipman (1984) for instance, in a paper on ethnography and public policy, describes policy-makers as "hungry for evidence," and he regards ethnographic work as having a clear potential role by virtue of the inadequacies of previous quantitative work. Sharp (1982) has claimed that theoretically embedded ethnography has a political rationale, since a scientific political practice requires knowledge of the fissures, ruptures, and contradictions in capitalism's mode of appearance which guide political and pedagogical work. Ethnography can offer insight concerning the points at which politicization is possible, feasible, and productive of greater awareness and concerning the processes through which this could be achieved, (p. 60)
But while such political aspirations speak with a "language of possibility" about establishing more equitable and democratic social arrangements within and outside school, ethnographers on the left have to be more specific about their effectiveness in bringing about such progressive change. There have been too many ethnographies diat conclude with a rousing appeal about the resistances and contestations, as well as the contradictions and systemic fissures identified by the ethnographer, while one is left almost entirely in the dark about whedier these spaces, these cracks in the structure, actually do modify, if not radically transform, the world in favor of progressive ends. In my study, there were varied responses by teachers and school principals, as well as boards of governors, to feedback sessions about my edinographic narrative. At one level these responses were quite positive: it was gratifying to see teachers acknowledge the damaging effects of structures, curricula, and pedagogies that they promoted unproblematically in schools and to engage widi them in an attempt to come up widi alternative, more transformative modes of practice. However, four years following that research, I really wonder whether it has made any real difference in the structures and practices of those schools. But there is, in the tradition of educational edinographic research, hardly any mention of die frustration such as I felt when, after spending so much time, money, and effort in carrying out research in those schools, I receive letters from friends who tell me mat things have not really changed at all. Assuming for a moment diat as a researcher I had all the technical details right (in terms of using die available tools effectively), men die problems diat need to be confronted are whether we still have to develop a theory of how an audience changes itself (i.e., does consciousness-raising work?) or if the tool, diat is, ethnography itself, is inadequate.
That the latter is probable emerges in Burbules's (1986) echoing of some of the concerns raised above, when he points to the need to move from description and analysis to active involvement within school communities. In the light of the issues raised throughout this paper, dierefore, future educational researchers should move away from merely describing school life to promoting specific versions of it, versions diat have been identified as being more equitable and democratic dian the ones currently being engendered. In other words, the radical researcher would be involved
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RONALD G. SULTANA in a sort of Freirian pedagogy -often advocated for teachers by radical researcherswhere she or he highlights various democratic and emancipatory voices, introducing new themes that heighten the chances for a truly critical education to occur. As Burbules (1986) notes, diis is a crucial theoretical and political shift because it supplants the attempt to study and understand, somewhat dispassionately, the prospects for school reform in favor of advocating such reform, insisting on its possibility and becoming actively involved in making the possible probable.
Conclusion
There is, of course, great skill in the edinographer's depiction of "life." The point of this paper has been that the real genius of the radical researcher will be to transform that "life" to come closer to a democratic vision. This is no easy task, for a number of reasons, some of which are very practical. It is doubtful whether the bureaucracies we call "schools" will allow any person to function inside die institution who has the explicit aim of bringing about change. The whole point of bureaucracies is systempreservation.
But it is incorrect to pursue a strategy, such as descriptive edinography, which, while satisfying, indeed gratifying, our "need" to know, is largely ineffective in promoting transformation. The method argued in favor of in this paper -what is referred to as "inverted edinography" -privileges silences because of die contention diat the more substantial is to be found in that absence. We dius (actually or figuratively) develop a sign to highlight certain ideological silences, much as during the Renaissance madiematicians developed "0" (zero) as "a sign about signs, a meta-sign whose meaning is to indicate, via a syntax which arrives widi it, the absence of certain odier signs" (Rotman, 1987, p. 1) . Since "ideology exists because diere are some things which must not be said" (Eagleton, 1976, p. 90) , "inverted edinography" can do very little diat is more radical than actually to dare to voice die unsaid. Thus, radical ethnography can shed its subservience to die regimes of realism in order to become a meditative and reflexive vehicle "because we come to it neidier as to a map of knowledge nor as a guide to action, nor even for entertainment. We come to it as die start of a different kind of journey" (Tyler, 1987, p. 140) .
